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This article examines the law of fixtures and chattels which governs the circumstances in 
which items of personal property that are attached to land become part of that land. Whether 
a chattel has become a fixture is crucial in a range of contexts including when land is sold or 
mortgaged. However, the law of fixtures has long garnered a reputation for complexity and 
obscurity; a position that endures today. Through examination of historical accounts and 
decided case law, this article explores the reasons for this reputation; identifies the central 
deficiencies and defects inherent in the law and argues that the existing approach is 
anachronistic, inconsistent and incoherent. Building on this, the article concludes by 
proposing a new framework for rationalisation and reform which would bring long-overdue 




This article proceeds in 3 parts. In this first part, the law of fixtures and chattels is introduced 
and the place and importance of the legal principles for property law is explored. Part II, 
drawing on key case law, isolates the key deficiencies and defects in the operation of the law 
in this area and, finally Part III proposes how the law can be rationalised and reformed 
through a new framework to govern the principles of fixtures and chattels. The law of fixtures 
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and chattels1 comprises the corpus of law which determines whether an item of movable, 
personal property brought onto land has become so attached to the land that it is properly 
to be regarded as having become part of that land. This is traditionally captured by the Latin 
maxim quicquid plantatur solo, solo cedit (whatever is attached to the land becomes part of 
it) which is routinely proffered as the cornerstone or bedrock of the law in this area. Once 
designated as a ‘fixture’, an item loses its character as personalty and, in effect, is regarded 
as being subsumed within the land itself and ‘annexed’ to it. As this article explores, this 
apparently simple distinction between fixture and chattel has, nonetheless, given rise to 
hundreds of years of confused and, at times, unhelpful case law, has vexed some of the 
greatest legal minds and, consequently, has failed to result in a clear or coherent legal ‘test.’2  
Yet, the distinction is a key one in property law. The fixture/chattel divide can have significant 
consequences in disputes that arise when land is sold, or mortgaged, or, after a landowner’s 
death, where parties tussle over who owns what. This is made all the more important by 
section 62 of the Law of Property Act 1925 which, described as a ‘word saving provision,’ 
provides that, if no contrary intention is expressed, a conveyance of land is deemed to convey, 
‘all buildings, erections, fixtures … at the time of the conveyance.’3 On sale of freehold land, 
for example, a disgruntled purchaser may seek to argue that particular items on the land 
amounted to fixtures and ought to have passed automatically to the new owner on 
 
1 On which see generally Megarry & Wade: The Law of Real Property 9th Ed (Sweet & Maxwell, 
2019), Chapter 22. 
2 See P. Luther, ‘Fixtures and Chattels: A Question of More or Less…’ 24(4) O.J.L.S., 597-618; 
M. Haley, ‘The law of fixtures: an unprincipled metamorphosis’ (1998) Conv. 137. 
3 S62(1) LPA 1925; this provision replaced s6 of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 
1881 which had a similar effect. S62 applies to all conveyances of land made after 31st 
December 1881: s62(6); S205(1)(ii) of the Law of Property Act 1925 defines ‘conveyance’ as 
including, ‘a mortgage, charge, lease, assent, vesting declaration, vesting instrument, 
disclaimer, release and every other assurance of property or of an interest therein by any 
instrument, except a will…’ 
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conveyance under s62 but were wrongly removed by the vendor. Questions also arise in the 
leasehold context as to when and, in what circumstances, fixtures can be removed from the 
land,4  for example, where a tenant has attached objects to the leased premises during the 
life of the tenancy, the tenancy has come to an end or the land sold and dispute ensues as to 
ownership of the items.5 There is, therefore, a need to be able to determine with precision 
and predictability, whether a given item is or is not a fixture. If one reaches for the textbooks 
or to decided case law, it is common to see the words of Blackburn J given as the starting 
point for an enunciation of the modern law of fixtures and chattels. As Blackburn J in Holland 
v Hodgson6 explained, ‘[i]t is a question which must depend on the circumstances of each 
case, and mainly on two circumstances … the degree of annexation and the object of the 
annexation.7 Blackburn J subsequently expanded on these words; refining and expanding his 
thoughts on these two ‘tests’: 
 
Perhaps the true rule is, that articles not otherwise attached to the land than by their 
own weight are not to be considered as part of the land, unless the circumstances are 
such, as to shew that they were intended to be part of the land, the onus of shewing 
that they were so intended lying on those who assert that they have ceased to be 
chattels, and that, on the contrary, an article which is affixed to the land even slightly 
is to be considered as part of the land, unless the circumstances are such as to shew 
 
4 This is known as the right to remove fixtures; see discussion in Megarry n1 above at [22-
011]-[22-022]. 
5 Specific rules and exceptions have developed in the law that allow trade, ornamental and 
agricultural fixtures. 
6 (1872) LR 7 CP 328. 
7 Ibid at 334. 
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that it was intended all along to continue a chattel, the onus lying on those who 
contend that it is a chattel.8 
 
Thus, the court is to deploy two ‘tests’ in determining the fixture/chattel status of an item; 
the former focusing on the degree or extent to which the item was annexed, attached, affixed 
to the land; the latter centring on inquiring as to the purpose and intention for which the item 
was so annexed. We are told, the question is ultimately one of fact and objective 
determination.9 As is explored in the next section, however, navigation of these two apparent 
‘tests’ has proved surprisingly confounding, and indeed clarity of exposition by the court has 
been severely lacking. Nevertheless, these two tests remain today as the applicable law.10 
Despite repeated references to the second purpose test as being the most decisive largely 
due to advances in technology which has made affixing and removing objects to and from 
land more straightforward,11 both tests remain in place and are engaged by the courts; most 
recent endorsed by the Supreme Court in Dill v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities 
& Local Government.12 In assessing the ‘degree’ of annexation, the court considers the extent 
of the connection between the item and the land, for example, whether the item is resting 
on the ground by its own weight13 or is freestanding, the means by which it is physically fixed 
 
8 Ibid at 335. 
9 Riverside Park Ltd v NHS Property Services Ltd [2016] EWHC 1313 (Ch); [2017] L. & T.R. 12 at 
[33]-[34] per HHJ Saffman. 
10 See, for example, engagement of both tests in Tower Hamlets LBC v Bromley LBC [2015] 
EWHC 1954 (Ch); [2015] B.L.G.R. 622; [2015] 7 WLUK 214 (Ch D). 
11 Berkley v Poulett [1977] 1 E.G.L.R. 86 at 89; See also Hamp v Bygrave [1983] 1 E.G.L.R. 
174 at 177: ‘the purpose of the annexation is now of first importance’ per Boreham J; see also 
TSB Bank Plc v Botham (1996) 73 P. & C.R. D1 at D2. 
12 Dill v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities & Local Government [2020] UKSC 20; 
[2020] 1 W.L.R. 2206 per Lord Carnwath at [40]-[44]. 
13 Holland v. Hodgson (1872) L.R. 7 C.P. 328; H.E. Dibble Ltd v Moore [1970] 2 Q.B. 181; Deen 
v Andrews (1985) 52 P. & C.R. 17 
 5 
to the land whether by screws or nails, the ease of removal of the item and whether this 
would involve demolition or damage to the item.14 As Scarman LJ famously noted in a leading 
case in this area, Berkley v Poulett, ‘if an object cannot be removed without serious damage 
to, or destruction of, some part of the realty, the case for its having become a fixture is a 
strong one.’15 Under the purpose of annexation test, the court considers whether the item is 
only annexed to the land for its better enjoyment as a chattel or whether to improve the land 
permanently. If the former, the item remains a chattel; if the latter, it has become a fixture. 
Again, this is an objective question and, we are told, is not concerned with the subjective 
intentions of the parties.16 As Lord Clyde explained in the House of Lords in Elitestone Ltd v 
Morris, ‘the purpose which the object is serving which has to be regarded, not the purpose of 
the person who put it there.’17 Further clarification (and perhaps complication) was added to 
the fixture/chattel distinction in Elitestone, which signalled a move towards adding a third 
categorisation to our understanding here; namely where an item is found to be ‘part and 
parcel of the land itself.’ Under this tripartite categorisation, as noted in Woodfall’s Landlord 
and Tenant,18 an object brought onto land may be classed as either (a) a chattel; (b) a fixture; 
or (c) part and parcel of the land itself. Objects falling into categories (b) or (c) are treated as 
being part of the land; those in category (a) are not. This third category was explored and 
applied in Elitestone itself19 where the House of Lords held that a bungalow resting on land 
by its own weight atop concrete pillars and which could only be removed with serious damage 
 
14 Elitestone Ltd v Morris [1997] 1 W.L.R. 687; Elwer v. Maw (1802) 3 East. 38 
15 Berkley v Poulett [1977] 1 E.G.L.R. 86 at 88 per Scarman LJ. 
16 Deen v Andrews (1985) 52 P. & C.R. 17 at 22. 
17 Elitestone Ltd v Morris [1997] 1 W.L.R. 687 at 698 per Lord Clyde. 
18 Woodfall, Landlord and Tenant (Loose leaf ed.), vol. 1, para. 13.131. 
19 This classification has also since been applied in Chelsea Yacht & Boat Co Ltd v Pope [2000] 
1 W.L.R. 1941 and in Wessex Reserve Forces & Cadets Association v White [2005] EWHC 983 
(QB); [2005] 5 WLUK 519. 
 6 
to the building, amounted to ‘part of the land itself’ and was not a chattel. Generally applying 
in cases concerning buildings, this third category and the language of ‘part of the land’ is 
preferred to ‘fixture’ in this context because, as Lord Lloyd explained, ‘in ordinary language 
one thinks of a fixture as being something fixed to a building. One would not ordinarily think 
of the building itself as a fixture.’20 Having laid down a summary of the existing law, the next 
Part of this article now moves to explore how the courts have struggled in navigating and 
explicating the fixture/chattel distinction and the deficiencies, defects and complexities in the 
law that this judicial treatment has both revealed and indeed promulgated. 
 
2. Judicial treatment of the law of fixtures & chattels: confusion, defects 
and deficiencies in the law 
 
The law of fixtures and chattels has received heavy criticism for being, ‘complex and 
confusing,’21 ‘elusive’ and for lacking uniformity and clarity.22 Indeed, it is almost 20 years 
since Luther explored the unstable, historical foundations of our law.23 There has, however, 
been little close scrutiny of the key deficiencies beyond broader statements of dissatisfaction 
with the established principles24 and less attention still paid to probing the problems in the 
modern law. This section fills this gap; drawing on decided case law to identify the central 
 
20 Elitestone Ltd v Morris at 690 per Lord Lloyd. 
21 P. Luther, ‘Fixtures and Chattels: A Question of More or Less…’ 24(4) O.J.L.S., 597-618 at 
597. 
22 Gray and Gray, Elements of Land Law (London: Butterworths, 3rd edn, 2000), at 45, 51. 
23 P. Luther, ‘Fixtures and Chattels: A Question of More or Less…’ 24(4) O.J.L.S., 597-618 at 
597. 
24 See, for example, M. Haley, ‘The law of fixtures: an unprincipled metamorphosis’ (1998) 
Conv. 137. 
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failings and defects in the governing principles. It is argued that there are 4 key deficiencies 
which can be identified; each warranting further examination and, taken together, make the 
case for reform in the area. These are: 
 
(i) Inconsistent and conflicting case law; 
(ii) The development of confused, complex and arbitrary analytical factors and indicators; 
(iii) The problematic concept of ‘architectural design’; 
(iv) The lingering uncertainty as to the role of intention. 
 
 
(i) Inconsistent and conflicting case law 
 
When Blackburn J expounded his two ‘tests’ in Holland v Hodgson for determining the status 
of fixtures and chattels, these principles, in theory at least, appeared straightforward, clear-
cut and defensible. One test would look to the degree of annexation; the other to the purpose 
for that annexation. As Blackburn explained with apparent ease: 
 
‘[B]locks of stone placed one on top of another without any mortar or cement for the 
purpose of forming a dry stone wall would become part of the land, though the same 
stones, if deposited in a builder’s yard and for convenience sake stacked on top of 
each other … would remain chattels …’25 
 
 
25 Holland v Hodgson, at 335 per Blackburn J  
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So far, so ostensibly simple. Indeed, one can readily conjure examples to which Blackburn 
J’s tests can easily be applied. Thus, as Blackburn himself noted, ‘the anchor of a large ship 
must be very firmly fixed in the ground…yet no one could suppose that it became part of the 
land.’26 However, as the jurisprudence has developed in this field and the courts have been 
called upon to apply the law to evermore complex scenarios and have sought to make 
practical sense of Blackburn’s ‘tests,’ inconsistency and incoherence have abounded and the 
apparent clarity and lucidity of Blackburn J’s words have been lost. The result is a body of case 
law that betrays contradiction and is difficult to reconcile (and at times even explain) which 
ultimately undermines rationality in the law. 
 
A number of case law examples will exemplify this incoherence and, in particular, serves 
to highlight how, despite applying the same legal tests and in very similar factual matrices, 
quite divergent results are reached. Thus, in Holland itself, wool looms in a worsted mill fixed 
with nails to wooden beams and in plugs driven into holes in stone were held to be fixtures 
and therefore part of the land. This was so despite evidence that they could be easily removed 
without causing any damage to the building. As Vaughan Williams LJ put it in Re De Falbe, 
‘one must ask oneself, is there any more fixing than was necessary for the enjoyment of the 
chattel as such?’ Engaging this question, why, then, could it not be said that the looms in 
Holland were chattels on the basis that they were affixed merely so as to be enjoyed and 
function as looms? In Re De Falbe itself,27 tapestries stretched over canvas, fastened by tacks 
and affixed to wood that covered the walls were held to be chattels on the basis that they 
 
26 Ibid. 
27 A case which reached the House of Lords: Leigh v Taylor [1902] A.C. 157; [1902] 2 WLUK 
24. 
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were affixed purely for ‘ornamentation’. Yet by contrast, in the renowned case of Lord 
Chesterfield's Settled Estates,28 Grinling Gibbons carvings, which had been affixed to a suite 
of rooms, were held to be fixtures. In Hulme v Brigham,29 printing machines weighing 9-12 
tons and standing by their own weight in a factory were held to be chattels and, so too, in the 
recent 2015 case of Fahstone ltd v Biesse Group UK Ltd,30 was an enormous and hefty 
computer-controlled woodworking machine held to be a chattel despite being bolted to the 
ground with 54 bolts resin-grouted into the floor. All these decisions engaged Blackburn J’s 
two tests and yet, in similar or comparatively similar factual contexts, the final determination 
of fixture/chattel status varied widely. 
 
As any student of property law will recount, many of the cases in the law of fixtures and 
chattels involve (perhaps curiously) garden statues, figures, vases and sundials. Again, here, 
there is a deep incongruity and contradiction in the approach of the court and the decision 
are difficult to reconcile. This lack of clarity is seen most clearly in case of Berkley v Poulett,31 
where Scarman LJ offered an important but regrettably confused and chaotic account of the 
competing impetuses in the law. As Scarman explained, where there was no physical 
annexation of an item, there could be no fixture yet added that where there was ‘a high 
degree of physical annexation’ the item could still, nevertheless, amount to a chattel. In 
addition, an object resting on the ground by its own weight could be a fixture if it was ‘so 
heavy that there [was] no need to tie it into a foundation.’32 With respect to Scarman LJ, as a 
 
28 Lord Chesterfield's Settled Estates [1911] 1 Ch 237 
29 Hulme v Brigham [1943] K.B. 152: a case involving a dispute between a mortgagor and a 
mortgagee. 
30 Fahstone Ltd v Biesse Group UK Ltd [2015] EWHC 3650 (TCC); 164 Con. L.R. 121. 
31 Berkley v. Poulett [1977] 261 E.G. 911 
32 Ibid at 913 per Scarman LJ. 
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summary of the law, this is a seriously confused picture. Ultimately, the court in Berkley found 
that paintings set into oak panelling, a large statue of a Greek athlete and a sundial resting on 
its own weight were chattels; all affixed for their enjoyment as chattels and not to 
permanently improve the land. Yet, there are many further cases which, on very analogous 
facts, reach polar opposite conclusions. In sharp juxtaposition to Berkley, in Hamp v 
Bygrave,33 garden ornaments and stone fittings resting on their own weight were held to be 
fixtures. Again, in D’Eyncourt v Gregory,34 lion statues, vases and stone garden seats resting 
on their own weight were, in contrast to Berkley, held to be fixtures on the basis that they 
formed part of the architectural design of the property. This concept of ‘architectural design’ 
is deeply problematic and is explored further below. Taken together, Berkley, Hamp and 
D’Eyncourt demonstrate the erratic and unpredictable nature of decision-making on the 
dividing line between fixtures and chattels. 
 
This same judicial muddle is discernible when contrasting case law on temporary or semi-
temporary structures. Thus, in Elitestone, the House of Lords drew a distinction between 
mobile homes (which were easily moved) and the bungalow in issue which, despite resting 
on its own weight on concrete pillars, was held to be a fixture as removal was only possible 
by causing damage to the structure. The Court of Appeal incidentally, applying the same 
‘tests’ had reached precisely the opposite conclusion.35 Similarly, in Spielplatz Ltd v Pearson,36 
a chalet resembling a bungalow on a naturist site in St Albans was held to be ‘part of the land’ 
 
33 Hamp v Bygrave [1983] 1 E.G.L.R. 174. 
34 D’Eyncourt v Gregory (1866) L.R. 3 Eq. 382. 
35 Elitestone Ltd v Morris [1995] 7 WLUK 361. 
36 Spielplatz Ltd v Pearson [2015] 2 P & CR 17 
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as moving it would require dismantling it into several parts. In Webb v Frank Bevis Ltd,37 a 
temporary structure comprising a corrugated iron shed resting on concrete was also found to 
be a fixture. Yet, by contrast, in Billing v Pill,38 an army hut, constructed in seven sections 
resting on a concrete foundation; the floor of the hut being secured by bolts into the concrete 
was deemed to be a chattel. So too, in Gilpin v Legg,39 beach huts were held to be chattels on 
the basis that they were removable even if this would result in some degree of damage to the 
huts. In the same vein, in a series of recent cases concerning houseboats, the court has found 
in favour of chattel status. In Chelsea Yacht & Boat Co Ltd v Pope,40 a houseboat was attached 
using ropes to the river wall, by way of anchor to the river bed and connected (on the 
houseboat owners’ evidence) ‘permanently’ to pontoons in order to receive electricity, gas 
and water supplies. The Court of Appeal held the boat to be a chattel as it could be removed 
from its position and disconnected from its utility supplies. In  Mew v Tristmire Ltd,41 the Court 
of Appeal again held that boats, converted into landing craft and resting on wooden platforms 
driven into the harbour bed were chattels. The Court of Appeal held that the boats could be 
removed without being unduly dismantled or destroyed and therefore did not enjoy the 
characteristics of fixtures. 
 
What becomes clear is that cases with ostensibly equivalent or, in many examples, near-
identical facts are routinely argued and decided in an entirely divergent fashion; reaching 
diametrically opposed conclusions when outwardly applying the same legal principles and 
 
37 Webb v Frank Bevis Ltd [1940] 1 All E.R. 247. 
38 Billing v Pill [1954] 1 Q.B. 70 
39 Gilpin v Legg [2017] EWHC3220(Ch) 
40 Chelsea Yacht & Boat Co Ltd v Pope [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1941. 
41 Mew v Tristmire Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 912; see also Hale v Watt LTL 11/3/2016 where a 
houseboat was also found to amount to a chattel. 
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‘tests.’ Many of these cases and the differential treatment of almost indistinguishable facts 
defies rational or coherent explanation. How can it be defensible that beach huts and 
houseboats connected to utility supplies are chattels yet sheds, army huts and bungalows 
resting on their own weight are fixtures? How can it be that statues and garden items are 
deemed chattels in Berkley but fixtures in D’Eyncourt? 
 
It is contented that, a key reason for this indeterminacy in the case law is the uneasy 
interaction and unresolved tension between Blackburn J’s two ‘tests’ of object and purpose. 
Presented as cumulative by Blackburn J, in practice, the importance of each test vacillates 
wildly from case to case and the tests are seen to bend and shift depending on the nature of 
the factual matrix before the court resulting in something of an unpredictable, analytical 
soup. Hundreds of years ago, as demonstrated by judgments such as Herlankenden’s Case42 
and Cave v Cave43 the degree of annexation (later formulated into Blackburn’s first test) took 
centre stage as the decisive and determining feature of the status of objects on land. This 
position was echoed and, to some degree, remains dominant in Australian jurisprudence in 
cases such as Australian Provincial Assurance v Coroneo44 and Belgrave Nominees Pty Ltd v 
Barlin-Scott Airconditioning Pty Ltd,45 where the Australian courts have indicated that the 
degree of annexation of an item alone can give rise to a presumption of fixture status subject 
to the availability of evidence that the affixer intended the object to be a chattel.46 
 
42 Herlankenden's Case (1589) 4 Rep. 62a. 
43 Cave v Cave (1705) 2 Vern. 508. 
44 Australian Provincial Assurance v Coroneo (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 700. 
45 Belgrave Nominees Pty Ltd v Barlin-Scott Airconditioning Pty Ltd [1984] VR 947 
46 See Belgrave Nominees Pty Ltd v Barlin-Scott Airconditioning Pty Ltd [1984] at 951 per Kaye 
J. 
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However, incrementally, as Amos & Ferard noted in their Treatise on Fixtures in 1827,47 this 
predominant and almost exclusive emphasis on the extent of physical annexation has become 
viewed as too severe and outmoded, ‘inequitable in its principle and injurious in its effects.’48 
In England, then, if not to the same extent in Australia, this has led to a recognition that the 
degree of annexation is not, of itself, a reliable determinant of fixture/chattel status. An early 
example of this shift towards greater consideration of the purpose for which items were 
brought onto land can be observed in the comments of Smith M.R in Monti v Barnes in 1901: 
 
The question ... is whether, having regard to the character of the article and the 
circumstances of the particular case, the article in question was intended to be 
annexed to the inheritance or to continue to be a mere chattel.49 
 
As Scarman L.J. famously noted in Berkeley v Poulett, ‘[A] degree of annexation which in 
earlier time the law would have treated as conclusive may now prove nothing … Today so 
great are the technical skills of affixing and removing objects to land or buildings that the 
second test is more likely than the first to be decisive.’50 Thus, whereas historically the 
affixment of an item made it almost impossible to sever from the realty, today, this is not the 
case – even seemingly permanent structures and buildings can be dismantled and reinstalled 
in a new location with little or no damage being caused; thus making it nonsensical to ascribe 
too great a weight to the means by which items are fixed to land. In light of Scarman’s 
comments, one may have assumed, then, that the degree of annexation test was no longer 
 
47 Amos & Ferard Treatise on Fixtures (1st ed., 1827). 
48 Amos & Ferard Treatise on Fixtures (1st ed., 1827), at xxi. 
49 Monti v. Barnes (1901) 1 Q.B. 205 at 207 per Smith M.R.  
50 Berkley, at 913.  
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relevant or perhaps even inapplicable. Yet, notwithstanding Scarman’s words, and looking at 
decided case law as explored above, it seems the court has evidently not discounted the 
degree of annexation test in any real sense. This does not mean, however, that the test is 
engaged consistently or rationally. In fact, as we have seen, much uncertainty springs from 
the court’s handling of ‘degree of annexation’ with some cases insisting on physical 
annexation before a fixture can exist;51 others demonstrating that fixtures can exist without 
any physical attachment to the land at all52 and the continued importance of the degree of 
annexation in the Australian courts. Indeed, in England, in recent cases such as Elitestone, 
Chelsea Yacht & Boat Co and Mew, paradoxically, the degree of annexation test appears to 
be making a significant revival; again taking centre stage in the court’s determination. The 
resulting position is incoherent: in some cases (and in some jurisdictions including Australia), 
the degree of annexation still appears crucial; in other cases, it appears to fall away in 
deference to analysis of the purpose of annexation. How one is to assess the precise role and 
significance to ascribe to the degree of annexation test is therefore yet another problematic 
area in the law and represents a key deficiency in the current legal framework. 
 
(ii) The development of confused, complex and arbitrary analytical factors and indicators 
 
A second key deficiency in the law of fixtures concerns the raft of complex and often arbitrary 
analytical principles and factors that have emerged in the case law. As the court has 
attempted to navigate the choppy waters of the fixture/chattel divide, judges have along the 
 
51 See dicta of Sir Richard Scott in Botham v TSB Bank plc (1997) 73 P. & C.R. D1. 
52 See discussion of D’Eyncourt v Gregory above. 
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way sought to devise a series of analytical indicators to assist them in their determinations.53 
These factors take the form of evidential presumptions and considerations to be explored 
subject to the particular facts of the case. These indicators are not expressed in Blackburn J’s 
classic enunciation of the two ‘tests’ for fixture status but rather have developed piecemeal 
through subsequent struggles by the court to interpret and apply the law. It is argued here 
that this development of a catalogue of, at times, complex, contradictory and artificial factors 
has only further obscured the legal principles; muddying the waters and rendering judicial 
reasoning less robust and less defensible. Key factors and considerations divined by the court 
include: an assessment of the relationship of the parties;54 whether any customary practice 
exists in the context or as regards the object in dispute;55  the difference in the value of the 
item if it is considered to be part of the land or not part of the land;56 the physical weight of 
the item and whether this has any bearing on annexation;57 and any damage that removal of 
the item would cause to the item itself or the land.58 The difficulties caused by these 
‘analytical indicators’ is seen most explicitly, however, in the contemporary case law. The 
decision which perhaps best captures and epitomises this problem is that of Botham v TSB 
Bank plc.59 It is contended that Botham represents the highwater mark of the artificiality and 
arbitrariness extant in the law of fixtures and provides further evidence of the unsatisfactory 
nature of the law in this area. 
 
 
53 See Haley (1985) N.L.J. 539-540. 
54 Norton v. Dashwood [1896] 2 Ch. 297 
55 Bain v. Brand (1876) A.C. 762 
56 Re Whaley [1908] 1 Ch. 615 
57 Berkeley v. Poulett 
58 Spyer v. Phillipson [1931] 2 Ch. 183; Elitestone. 
59 On which, see M. Haley, ‘The law of fixtures: an unprincipled metamorphosis? (1998) Conv., 
137-144. 
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In Botham, the Court of Appeal was called upon to determine the status of a wide range 
of everyday, household items ranging from carpets, to light fittings, to curtains, to bathroom 
accessories, mirrors, kitchen units, to kitchen appliances. In considering these items, Roch LJ 
who delivered the leading judgment, highlighted 4 ‘indicators’ which he said guided 
application of the two ‘test’ in the law of fixtures.60 First, if the item is essentially ornamental, 
it will in most cases indicate a chattel. There would be cases, however, such as kitchen or 
bathroom tiles which despite being ornamental would be fixtures. Secondly, the ability to 
remove items without damaging the fabric of the building will indicate a chattel. If easily 
removed, it will be a chattel but there would, said Roch LJ, be examples such as integrated 
hobs and cookers set into worktops which would nevertheless be fixtures. The lifespan of the 
item would also be considered. The longer the lifespan, the greater the likelihood of it being 
a fixture. Thirdly, the nature of ownership of the item would be a further indicator. If the item 
is owned by the land owner, it will be a fixture; if it belonged to another (e.g. bought on hire 
purchase), it will be a chattel. Fourthly, the person who installed the item was a highly 
relevant factor. It the item was installed by a builder; it would likely be a fixture. If the item 
was installed by a carpet fitter or curtain supplier or the occupier herself; it would likely be a 
chattel. 
 
These four ‘indicators’ presented in Botham, almost as presumptions of fixture or chattel 
status, mark a new turn in the law of fixtures. Not before Botham, have such explicit analytical 
factors and presumptive ‘indicators’ been expressed in a judgment in this area. Much of Roch 
LJ’s reasoning was also new to the law here. Indicators four and five, for example, represent 
 
60 Botham at D3. 
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a surprising departure and expansion in the considerations to be taken into account when 
determining the fixture/chattel distinction. Focusing on ownership of the item and third party 
rights over those items was a novel intervention in Botham and a stark move beyond the 
narrower terms of Blackburn J’s tests as explored by the House of Lords in Elitestone. Roch LJ 
referred to the ‘modern judicial gloss’ placed on Blackburn J’s tests in the law of fixtures. 
However, it is submitted that Roch LJ’s approach far exceeds a gloss and takes the law into 
entirely new territory which, sadly, only serves to further demonstrate the artificiality of the 
principles in this area. Taking Roch LJ’s indicators to their logical conclusion would lead to the 
absurd position that items installed by a builder in a newly-constructed house would 
seemingly automatically become fixtures yet those installed later by another contractor 
would remain as chattels. This is, respectfully, irrational. Given the courts have gone to great 
lengths to re-emphasise that the determination of an item’s status is an objective test,61 it 
must be ‘untenable’ to permit an inquiry into the identity of the item’s installer. For hundreds 
of years, there has been a near-incontestable understanding that the focus should be on the 
nature of the item itself as opposed to who put it there.62 Enquiries into third party rights in 
the objects and slender distinctions between builders and contractors appear unhelpful, 
distinctly subjective in nature and arbitrary. 
 
Reflecting on the decision in Botham, Haley wrote that, ‘[i]t is, indeed, a sad commentary 
of the present law that it requires the Court of Appeal to decide whether mundane, household 
items, such as a sink and cooker, are fixtures and chattels.’63 Certainly, the conclusions 
 
61 This ‘objective determination’ is explored and challenged discussed below. 
62 See, for example, Viscount Hill v. Bullock [1887] 2 Ch. 482; dicta Lord Clyde in Elitestone, at 
698. 
63 M. Haley, ‘The law of fixtures: an unprincipled metamorphosis? (1998) Conv., 137, at 144. 
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reached by Roch LJ in Botham do little to soothe concerns at the incongruity, artificiality and 
capriciousness of the law. Exemplifying the arbitrariness of the decision, the Court of Appeal 
concluded that while soap dishes, toilet roll holders and towel rails were to be regarded as 
fixtures; carpets, curtains, gas and electric fires and kitchen appliances were chattels. These 
determinations are hard to justify and even harder to explain; highlighting both the problems 
inherent within the law but also its limits. A legal framework that is unable to be deployed 
rationally and convincingly in the everyday world of soap dishes and kitchen sinks is surely a 
framework not fit for purpose. In truth, many of the determinations made in Botham could 
readily have been decided in the opposite direction. There are, for example, strong grounds 
for arguing that soap dishes should be regarded as chattels and built-in fire places are fixtures. 
The result, post-Botham, is a ragbag, a farrago of analytical ‘indicators’, factors and 
considerations many with little provenance or practical utility. This is perhaps unsurprising 
given the inconsistency already present in the jurisprudence in this field. In short, what we 
see in Botham is the culmination of years of decided case law that ‘lacks coherence and 
clarity’64 under which the law of fixtures collapses into a series of often conflicting 
considerations operating chiefly at the impulse of the judge determining the case. This has 
serious consequences for legal certainty and predictability in the law, especially for those 
advising clients of their rights. 
 





One concept that is particularly problematic in the law of fixtures is that of the so-called 
‘architectural design’ or ‘aesthetic scheme.’ As noted earlier in this article, an item which 
would otherwise appear to constitute a chattel may, nevertheless, be afforded fixture status 
if it is found to form part of a composite, architectural design or aesthetic scheme. Naturally, 
this renders crucial the ability to determine with precision the circumstances in which such a 
scheme will arise. It is argued here, however, that the boundaries of this concept of 
‘architectural design’ are deeply ambiguous and far from certain. 
 
Authority for this approach comes from the case of D’Eyncourt v Gregory where lion 
statues, vases and stone garden-seats resting on their own weight and not otherwise fixed to 
the land were held to be fixtures as they, ‘formed part of the original design of the house’ and 
were therefore ‘irremovable.’65 Lord Romilly M.R. expanded on his thinking: 
 
[The items] appear to me to come within the category of articles that cannot be 
removed. I think it does not depend on whether any cement is used for fixing these 
articles, or whether they rest by their own weight, but upon this—whether they are 
strictly and properly part of the architectural design for the hall and staircase itself, 
and put in there as such, as distinguished from mere ornaments to be afterwards 
added. There may be mansions in England on which statues may be placed in order to 
complete the architectural design as distinguished from mere ornament; and when 
they are so placed, as, for instance, they are in the cathedral of Milan , I should 
 
65 D’Eyncourt v Gregory at 391. 
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consider that they could not properly be removed, although they were fixed without 
cement or without brackets, and stand by their own weight alone. [emphasis added]66 
 
Lord Romilly noted other examples such as the stone of a mill which is so much a part 
of the mill that it is to be regarded as part of the land itself. This designation of ‘architectural 
design’ is, however, problematic and its boundaries unclear. Indeed, in an earlier edition of 
Megarry & Wade, the authors noted in a footnote corresponding to D’Eyncourt, ‘the 
authority on this decision is not great.’67 Serious doubt was also expressed as to Lord 
Romilly’s reasoning by Rigby LJ in Re De Falbe: 
 
As regards D'Eyncourt v. Gregory42 , I do not hesitate to say that I feel great difficulty, 
owing in part to what seems to me the very inconclusive reasoning of Lord Romilly 
M.R. in support of his decision. Another instance which was referred to by Lord 
Romilly, namely, the upper grindstone of a mill, does not appear to me to be at all 
applicable. In my opinion the ruling as to [architectural design] in that case cannot be 
maintained, unless it should turn out that there was some proof (of which I can find 
no trace in the report) that the house was fitted to the tapestry rather than the 
tapestry to the house, and in that way (although I do not say that even then it would 
be clear) it might be possible to support the decision, on the ground that the tenant 
for life who affixed the tapestry had shewn a plain intention to add it irrevocably and 
 
66 Ibid at 396. 
67 Megarry & Wade, The Law of Real Property , 3rd ed (1966). 
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permanently to the house … the decision in D'Eyncourt v. Gregory is not right … I must 
hold that the decision ought not to be followed.68 
 
 
The issue was again revisited in the case of In Re Whaley 69 in which Neville J considered 
the status of tapestries which were fixed to the walls, nailed onto wooden frames 
themselves fastened with screws; and a picture of the Queen painted directly onto wood. 
Neville J concluded that the tapestries and paintings amounted to fixtures as they were part 
of a general scheme of decoration and not fixed for their better enjoyment as chattels. 
Neville J explained:  
 
[The] decoration originally was intended to give the whole room the appearance of an 
Elizabethan room, that the whole decoration was in unison, and that the ornaments 
were inserted, primarily, for the purpose of creating a beautiful room as a whole.70 
 
The decision of In Re Whaley was cited with approval though went entirely untested by 
Scarman LJ in Berkley v Poulett.71 In Kennedy v Secretary of State for Wales,72 a carillon clock 
housed in a Grade II listed building and resting by its own weight was considered to be a 
fixture as it was held to form part of the design of the historic house and of the tradition of 
the building that the clock bells would ring out across the local countryside. 
 
68 Re De Falbe per Rigby LJ at 531-532. 
69 In Re Whaley [1907 W. 3120.]; [1908] 1 Ch. 615 
70 Ibid at 619-620. 
71 Berkley at 89. 
72 Kennedy v Secretary of State for Wales [1996] E.G.C.S. 17 
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The decisions of D’Eyncourt, In Re Whaley and Kennedy can, however, be contrasted 
sharply with decisions exploring the concept of ‘architectural design’ in more contemporary 
contexts. Thus, in Botham, so-called ‘white goods’ including fridges, dishwashers and washing 
machines were held to be chattels even though it might conceivably have been argued that 
they formed part of an overall ‘kitchen design.’ The most recent pronouncement on the issue 
is London Borough of Tower Hamlets v London Borough of Bromley.73 This case is interesting 
for several reasons: first, it provided an opportunity to revisit the law on the classification of 
an ornamental objects resting on land by their own weight; secondly, the facts were quite 
distinct from the standard fixture/chattel cases in that it concerned a work of public art – a 
bronze sculpture ‘Draped Seated Woman’ by Henry Moore which had been placed in 1962 by 
London County Council in the grounds of the far-from-affluent Stifford Estate which 
comprised three tower blocks in Stepney, East London. This was not, therefore, a case 
involving tapestries or oak panelling or statues of lions in large country estates; and finally, 
this case offers the latest discussion of the law surrounding ‘architectural design’ in a decision 
involving a work of sculpture. Dispute broke out between two councils with Tower Hamlets 
wishing to sell the sculpture; Bromley London Borough Council (as successor to London 
County Council) opposing the plan and wanting the sculpture to remain in place ‘for the 
benefit of the people of London.’ For our purposes, the key question was whether the 
sculpture was a chattel or a fixture. Norris J in the High Court engaged a strict and narrow 
reading of the ‘architectural design’ concept noting that: 
 
73 London Borough of Tower Hamlets v London Borough of Bromley [2015] EWHC 1954 (Ch); 
on which see M. Iljadica, ‘Is a sculpture "land"? London Borough of Tower Hamlets v London 
Borough of Bromley [2015] EWHC 1954 (Ch)’ (2016) Conv. 242, 250. 
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The sculpture is an entire object in itself. It rested by its own weight upon the ground 
and could be (and was) removed without damage and without diminishing its inherent 
beauty. It might adorn or beautify a location, but it was not in any real sense 
dependant upon that location … in my view the sculpture’s power was no greater in 
Stepney than in Cologne or Melbourne. The sculpture did not form part of an integral 
design of the Stifford Estate; and whilst it must have been intended to confer some 
benefits upon the residents of the Stifford Estate it conferred equal benefits upon 
anyone passing along Jamaica Street or Stepney Green.74 
 
The sculpture was therefore a chattel. On one view the result is surprising. One might 
have thought that, given the purpose for which the art was placed on the land, i.e. to enhance 
the enjoyment of the property and for the benefit of the public, that this might have been 
influential in persuading the court that the sculpture was ‘part of the land’ and thus a fixture. 
The finding by Norris J that the sculpture conferred ‘equal benefit’ on those passing by it as 
those residents of the estate and that this was indicative of a chattel is curious and, it is argued 
here, wrong. We are told that the degree and purpose of annexation tests are to be engaged 
objectively yet the court in Tower Hamlets focused on the particular audience for the art as a 
relevant consideration. In none of the leading case law, is the visibility and audience for the 
object cited as a relevant factor. The key distinguishing feature that sets apart the case of 
Tower Hamlets from D’Eyncourt, In Re Whaley and Kennedy is its public-facing context in that 
it concerned a piece of art installed in a community setting for the enjoyment of the wider 
 
74 Tower Hamlets LBC v Bromley LBC at [17]. 
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viewing public. Given the public nature of the sculpture, it is argued that this should have 
been examined more closely by the court as going to the issue of the overall ‘architectural 
design’ and purpose for the installation. Documentary evidence before the court highlighted 
London County Council’s intention that placement of the sculpture was ‘not for purely 
aesthetic reasons … [but] part of the policy to improve Londoners’ lives and living standards. 
The new Stifford Estate was a prestigious site and a suitable prestigious sculpture was 
therefore required to put in it.’75 The conclusion by the court, then, that the item was a chattel 
could be construed as overlooking the wider social, public benefits of art installations. There 
are other implications of the judgment. The decision that the art was not part of the design 
scheme of the property would suggest that only those objects installed at the time buildings 
are constructed are able to satisfy the ‘architectural design’ test. Yet, there is no evidence 
that this was the case in D’Eyncourt nor in In Re Whaley or Kennedy. An argument can, 
therefore, be made that the ‘test’ for architectural design was applied far too restrictively in 
Tower Hamlets and could usefully be expanded to embrace a wider conception of aesthetic 
schemes in the public realm in order to reflect the public benefits such art can bring when 
placed with a broader social purpose in mind. Taken together, on decided case law, the 
boundaries of the ‘architectural design’ principle are far from clear. It appears the principle is 
available only in scenarios concerning private land, private objects and private spaces as 
opposed to public art installations placed for wider community consumption. How could this 
be justified? Perhaps this public-private distinction and differentiation of treatment might be 
explained, for example, on policy grounds that public art should be capable of removal, 
relocation and re-installation to ensure its maximum impact and to increase and spread public 
 
75 Ibid at [10] citing the words of Pat Hardy, curator of paining, prints and drawings at the 
Museum of London. 
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access to and enjoyment of the art as opposed to private items fixed to private land with a 
necessarily narrower audience. Nevertheless, this is vital discussion and analysis that should 
have been aired and explored by the court in Tower Hamlets yet was absent. Without such 
clarity and exposition, the very concept of ‘architectural design’ or aesthetic scheme is left to 
discriminate inexplicably and problematically between public and private spaces and 
contexts. 
 
Stepping back and reflecting on the assembled case law around ‘architectural design,’ it 
appears that what has developed is a rather precarious, anachronistic and antiquated 
principle according to which ornamental objects placed in historic houses, Grade-listed 
mansions in privately-owned spaces may be classed as fixtures but those installed in the 
public sphere in less auspicious and less affluent public spaces will not attract the same 
protections. In essence, the principle has become one closer to the ambitions of Heritage 
England or the National Trust in its application; focused on preserving a ‘beautiful room’ (In 
Re Whaley) or maintaining archaic traditions (ringing of the bells in Kennedy) rather than a 
principle that is strictly defensible by reference to wider property law conceptions. Even if 
one were to accept that mass produced, fungible objects (such as white goods in Botham) do 
not form part of an aesthetic scheme as compared to, say, rarer, bespoke, ornamental items 
(such as tapestries or clocks), how can we explain Tower Hamlets? It is striking that the 
principle was regarded as inapplicable in relation to a rare, ornamental sculpture in the public 
context in Tower Hamlets. Seemingly, the law does not extend to public art and housing 
estates. In short, the line between a finding of, on the one hand, an architectural scheme and, 
on the other hand, chattels that are attached to land merely for their own ‘better enjoyment 
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as chattels,’ is a narrow and unsatisfactory one. This is something Lord Romilly MR himself 
acknowledged in D’Eyncourt: 
 
I admit that the distinction between such statues as are added by way of ornament, 
and such as belong to an architectural design, and form part of the design itself, is 
extremely thin, and that in many cases it would be difficult to distinguish them, unless 
it were done in an arbitrary manner, so closely might one run into the other.76 
 
It is hard to justify why a piece of art that is carefully selected, placed in a public setting 
to accrue benefits for those on the land as well as the wider public cannot be viewed as falling 
within a specific design scheme when wall-mounted tapestries in a single room can. Again, 
we see the law of fixtures drawing indefensible distinctions, struggling to adapt to modern 
society and to new contexts just as it failed to provide credible answers to the status of 
everyday items in Botham. This severely undermines the ‘architectural design’ principle; a 
principle that the authors of Megarry & Wade and even Lord Romilly M.R. himself doubted. 
 
 
(iv) The lingering uncertainty as to the role of intention 
 
A final area for discussion is the ongoing and vexed question of the role of intention in the 
court’s determination of the fixture/chattel divide. Despite judicial pronouncements, this 
remains a highly contested and problematic issue. The matter was inevitably sparked by the 
 
76 D’Eyncourt per Lord Romilly M.R. at 392-393. 
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words of Blackburn J himself who, in his formulation of the two ‘test’ in Holland, made several 
references to considering intention behind the object and purpose of any annexation:77 
 
Articles not otherwise attached to the land than by their own weight are not to be 
considered as part of the land, unless the circumstances are such as to shew that they 
were intended to be considered as part of the land, the onus of shewing that they 
were so intended on those who assert that they have ceased to be chattels. [emphasis 
added] 78 
 
Any confusion in this area appears to have been sown by Blackburn and, despite judicial 
statements since, the matter continues to rumble on and present difficulties for the clarity of 
the law. As Luther has examined, tracing the pre-Holland case law, there are scant references 
to intention present in the earlier decisions of the court and those that do exist relate to case 
law or aspects of cases that are not directly concerned with the law of fixtures.79 Questions 
as to the role of intention therefore appear to have been transplanted afresh into the law 
expressly through Blackburn J’s words. In fact, Blackburn J even sought to explain Lord 
Romilly’s decision in D’Eyncourt on the basis of intention, noting, ‘if the intention is apparent 
to make the articles part of the land, they do become part of the land: see D'Eyncourt v. 
Gregory;’80 a case in which Lord Romilly expressly did not use the word intention in 
determining the fixture question. As Luther observes: 
 
 
77 Holland per Blackburn J at 334-335. 
78 Ibid at 335. 
79 P. Luther, ‘Fixtures and Chattels: A Question of More or Less…’ 24(4) O.J.L.S., 597, at 615. 
80 Holland per Blackburn J at 335. 
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The difficulty with Blackburn J’s broad formulation of intention [is that] in his apparent 
desire to make the law seem more logical and coherent, Blackburn J made an over-
general statement which increased the potential for uncertainty and confusion.81 
 
Blackburn J’s invocation of intention has resulted in a series of attempts by the court to 
‘clarify’ the precise ambit of intention in the law of fixtures. A first serious attempt was offered 
in Hobson v Gorringe,82 where a dispute arose as to whether an engine bolted and screwed 
to the mill floor was a chattel or a fixture. There was an agreement in writing between the 
parties and even a metal plate attached to the engine making plain the item belonged to the 
claimant. Despite this and contrary to the agreement reached, the court held that the item 
was a fixture and passed to the mortgagee as it was annexed to the land. The agreement was 
not relevant to the status of the engine. As A.L. Smith LJ explained intention should be 
assessed objectively: 
 
Lord Blackburn, when dealing with the ‘circumstances to shew intention’ was 
contemplating and referring to circumstances which shewed the degree of annexation 
and the object of such annexation … not to the circumstances of a chance agreement 
that might or might not exist between an owner of a chattel and [another].83 
 
Gorringe was applied by the House of Lords in Melluish v BMI,84 and notably endorsed in 
Elitestone v Morris where, again, the House of Lords disregarded subjective assumptions and 
 
81 P. Luther, ‘Fixtures and Chattels: A Question of More or Less…’ 24(4) O.J.L.S., 597, at 617. 
82 Hobson v Gorringe [1897] 1 Ch 182. 
83 Ibid at 193. 
84 Melluish v BMI [1996] AC 454. 
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an inferred agreement between the landowner and bungalow occupier as to separate 
ownership of the bungalow. As Lord Lloyd held, the agreement did not impact on the legal 
status of the bungalow: 
 
The decision of the House in Melluish put beyond question, the intention of the parties 
is only relevant to the extent that it can be derived from the degree and object of the 
annexation. The subjective intention of the parties cannot affect the question whether 
the chattel has, in law, become part of the freehold.85 
 
The effect of Lord Lloyd’s dictum is that not only would the court not have regard to 
express agreements between the party attaching the chattel and the land owner but even 
inferred or implied agreements or any assumptions existing between the parties would be 
discounted. Lord Lloyd’s words have subsequently been applied in Wessex Reserve Forces & 
Cadets Association v White,86 Spielplatz v Pearson87 and in Riverside Park Ltd v NHS Property 
Services Ltd.88 
 
To what extent, then, can it be argued that the issue of intention continues to vex the 
law of fixtures? There are three key grounds here. First, despite repeated statements that the 
question of fixture and chattel status is a matter of objective determination, there are case 
law examples which appear, in practice, to fly in the face of this assertion. This is observed 
 
85 Elitestone at 693; for a discussion of this case, see H. Conway, ‘Elitestone Ltd v Morris’ (1998) 
Conv. 418,426. 
86 Wessex Reserve Forces & Cadets Association v White [2005] EWHC 983 (QB); [2006] 1 P. & 
C.R. 22. 
87 Spielplatz Ltd v Pearson [2015] 2 P & CR 17 
88 Riverside Park Ltd v NHS Property Services Ltd [2016] EWHC 1313 (Ch); [2017] L. & T.R. 12. 
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most notably in the architectural design cases where it is impossible to argue that the court 
confined its analysis to a purely objective account. How can the cases such as D’Eyncourt, In 
Re Whaley and Kennedy (all explored above) be explained except by acknowledging that the 
court made reference to the subjective intention underlying the architectural designs? In 
other words, in all three cases, in order for the court to satisfy itself that the items (tapestries, 
painting and a clock) were connected to their respective buildings not purely as 
ornamentation but as part of an architectural design and thus part of the land, the court 
intuitively considered the subjective motivations underlying those designs. The court could, 
of course, have confined itself to an entirely objective examination by asking, for example, 
what would a reasonable bystander have understood from the attachment of the items to 
the land? Or, alternatively, would a reasonable bystander have considered a particular item 
to form part of an architectural or aesthetic scheme? While this objective approach might be 
criticised for its potential for unpredictability and artificiality, adopting such an approach 
would nevertheless have remained faithful to the court’s earlier rejection of subjectivity. 
Instead, the court’s analysis reached beyond a solely objective assessment and extended into 
an inquiry of matters of pure subjectivity such as the wishes and desires of those creating the 
architectural aesthetic (D’Eyncourt); the ambition and intention to ensure a themed and 
‘beautiful room’ (In Re Whaley) and the local traditions of hearing the ringing of the bells 
(Kennedy). Such an assessment is distinctly subjective in nature and runs counter to the 
apparent rejection of subjectivity espoused in Melluish and Elitestone; casting doubt on the 
rationality of those assertions.  
 
Secondly, as Luther has argued, even if one were to accept or approve of the rejection of 
subjective intention as expressed in Melluish and Elitestone, such a rejection nevertheless can 
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be construed as doing ‘considerable harm to Blackburn J’s formulation if an express 
agreement cannot be taken as evidence of a party’s intention, whereas nuts as bolts can be.’89 
Here, Luther is referring specifically to the case of Gorringe itself where priority was given to 
the nature of the annexation (with nuts and bolts) over the express agreement as to 
ownership entered between the parties. It might be argued that Blackburn J’s classic 
formulation of the ‘tests’ in the law of fixtures and the logic of his analysis is heavily 
undermined, and arguably fairness in the law is compromised, if express agreements such as 
this are ignored. Blackburn J in Holland noted how intention may sometimes run counter to 
and even contradict assumptions that might otherwise be made based on physical 
attachment. However, whether or not there is such a conflict, one might ask, where is the 
harm in ascribing weight to express or inferred agreements entered with eyes open between 
consenting, informed adults aware of the legal consequences? Surely, recourse to such 
evidence of intention provides further (and arguably a firmer) basis for determining the status 
of the items than is observed in much of the inconsistent case law; the courts grappling often 
to make sense of how easily an item might be dismantled or how robustly it be fixed to the 
ground. Are these not questions for determination by experts and engineers rather than 
jurists? It is contended that the court might meaningfully engage with subjectivity as an 
additional evidential tool as part of its wider, contextual analysis in reaching a settled view of 
the status of an item. This may serve to increase the rationality and predictability in the law 
and offer a more stable, transparent bases for justifying the court’s conclusions. 
 
 
89 P. Luther, ‘Fixtures and Chattels: A Question of More or Less…’ 24(4) O.J.L.S., 597, at 618. 
 32 
Thirdly, and building on the above, looking outside England, one can finds support from 
other Commonwealth jurisdictions for taking a different approach to intention; departing 
from that espoused in Melluish and Elitestone. In Australia and New Zealand, the suggestion 
has been raised that parties’ subjective intentions ought to be taken into account when 
determining if an item has become a fixture, especially, where there is no third party involved 
in the dispute.90 The thrust of the argument is that, if no third party exist to be prejudiced by 
an agreement reached between two parties going to the issue of the status of the item, why 
should this agreement not be given full effect and contribute to determination of the issue? 
In support of this view, Tipping J in the new Zealand case of Lockwood Buildings Ltd v. Trust 
Bank Canterbury Ltd,91 remarked that: 
[T]he advantage of a wholly objective ... approach is that this is all that will ordinarily 
be apparent to a third party not having had any dealing with the owner of the realty 
or the owner of the chattel. [This approach] ... need not necessarily apply when a 
question arises between the landowner and the person claiming that the item has 
remained a chattel. Those persons may regulate the issue between them as they see 
fit by contract or otherwise.92 
Similarly in Australia, in Ball-Guymer v. Livanes,93 a case concerning construction of an 
office inside a warehouse, the court found that the plaintiffs were entitled to erect and 
remove the office as it amounted to a chattel. The court was heavily influenced by the 
 
90 An example of a third party dispute would be sale of land where dispute arises as to the 
status of an item attached to that land. 
91 Lockwood Buildings Ltd v. Trust Bank Canterbury Ltd91 [1995] 1 N.Z.L.R. 22. 
92 Ibid at 29. 
93 Ball-Guymer v. Livanes (1990) 102 F.L.R. 
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subjective intentions of the parties as evidenced from the licence agreement they had 
reached. Peter Butt, who has advocated in Australia for a greater role for subjective intentions 
in this area, argues: 
While private agreements concerning the intended status of an item as chattel or 
fixture are not permitted to prejudice the interests of third parties, it is difficult to see 
why the courts should discount the parties' actual intentions where no third parties 
are involved.94 
More recently in the Australian case of National Australia Bank Ltd v Blacker,95 Conti J 
acknowledged the approach in Elitestone as to objective determination but noted the 
argument for greater engagement with subjectivity: 
Despite this, there are some modern authorities which would leave room for recourse 
to actual and hence subjective intention. This may be more accurately limited to the 
extent that it would assist the Court to determine the level of permanence or 
temporariness for which the item is intended to remain in position and the purpose 
to be served by its affixation or annexation: see N.H. Dunn Pty Ltd v L.M. Ericsson Pty 
Ltd (1979)… observations of O'Connor J in Reid v Smith [1905] HCA 54 … and Walsh J 
in Anthony v The Commonwealth  (1973) 47 ALJR 83… it may well be that there will be 




94 P. Butt, ‘What is a fixture?’ (1997) 71 A.L.J. 820 at 821. 
95 National Australia Bank Ltd v Blacker (2000) 179 A.L.R. 97 
96 Ibid at [12]. 
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Although there is a degree of tentativeness in these suggestions for engagement of 
subjective intentions, there is a long-standing and growing debate as to the defensibility of 
the prohibition on consideration of subjective matters. In many cases, especially those where 
evidence is short as to the purpose of annexation of an item, it is difficult to understand why 
the court should not have regard to any agreement reached between the parties as part of 
its wider analysis of the facts of the case. This is not to suggest that the agreement of itself 
can alter, in law, whether the items is properly to be regarded as a chattel, fixture or part of 
the land but rather the agreement can provide crucial evidence from which a court can 
discern the status of such items. In Botham, for example, there was no direct evidence of the 
nature and degree of annexation of the items. Surely, anything which might support the court 
in its determination is to be welcomed. In view of the energy in this debate in New Zealand 
and Australia, this matter remains a live one and is yet another example of the continuing 
vagaries and unsettled nature of the law of fixtures. Having outlined four key deficiencies in 
the law, this article now moves in its final part to propose a new framework to govern the 
principles of fixtures and chattels which, it is argued, redresses these defects. 
 
3. A new framework for the law of fixtures and chattels 
 
As this article has demonstrated, the current law of fixtures and chattels is incoherent, 
inconsistent and unpredictable. Determinations as to whether an item attached to land is a 
chattel or fixture are often arbitrary, artificial or reasoned on a confused or ambiguous basis. 
In particular, the uneasy interaction and unresolved tension between the degree and purpose 
of annexation tests has resulted in a body of inconsistent case law and legal principles that 
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have been described as ‘unsatisfactory, unclear and unduly cumbersome.’97 In short, the law 
in this area, long regarded as problematic, is anachronistic and requires reform. As Luther has 
explored at length,98 the historical foundations of the law of fixtures are shaky and the 
assumptions underlying Blackburn J’s classic formulation of the two ‘tests’ for fixture status 
are open to significant challenge. Even the ancient Latin maxim quicquid plantatur solo, solo 
cedit, said to be the foundation stone of the law in this area, on close reading of the 
authorities, is revealed as having a questionable provenance, only a loose and somewhat 
dubious connection with our law and is of little practical utility.99 The maxim has been 
stretched and adapted by the common law to such an extent that it is barely recognisable 
from its Roman Law origins. Yet, until now, there has been no clear proposal for a way forward 
that addresses these concerns. In this part, a proposal is offered for the development of a 
new framework to govern the law of fixtures and chattels that offers certainty, clarity and 
coherence and sits in sharp contrast to the current approach. 
 
This article has exposed that the deficiencies and defects in the law of fixtures spring chiefly 
from the amalgam of complex, often conflicting and confounding ‘tests’ and analytical factors, 
presumptions and indicators taken into account by the courts. In proposing a new approach 
to the law, therefore, the central ambition is to streamline, simplify and clarify the applicable 
legal principles to overcome the identified defects of the current regime. With that in mind, 
what is proposed is a stripped-back, readily-understood and easily-applied model designed 
to remove much of the indeterminacy of the existing ‘rough and ready mechanism.’100  
 
97 Ibid. 
98 P. Luther, ‘Fixtures and Chattels: A Question of More or Less…’ 24(4) O.J.L.S., 597 
99 Ibid, at 598-600. 
100 M. Haley, ‘The law of fixtures: an unprincipled metamorphosis’ (1998) Conv. 137, at 144. 
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The proposed new framework discards Blackburn J’s two ‘tests’ and the myriad of analytical 
‘indicators’ and replaces them with an overarching presumption that all items brought onto 
land prima facie amount to chattels. This presumption would be a heavy but rebuttable one 
and, if rebutted, an item would then be regarded as a fixture and part of the land. The 
presumption of chattel could be rebutted on two principal grounds. First, the presumption 
could be rebutted by adducing evidence of an agreement (express, implied or inferred) 
between the parties as to the ownership and status of the item. Secondly, the presumption 
could be rebutted if the court was satisfied that it would be unreasonable or inequitable to 
allow removal of the item from the land. Under this new framework, the uneasy tension 
between the object and purpose of annexation tests that has bedevilled the law of fixtures 
for almost 150 years would be banished; the panoply of artificial indicative factors engaged 
by the court would be jettisoned, the principle of ‘architectural design’ rendered unnecessary 
and the long-running debate as to the role of subjective intentions finally settled. Under the 
new framework, the starting point would not be the object or the purpose of annexation – 
unhelpful considerations such as items ‘resting by their own weight’ and conceptions such as 
instalment for ‘better enjoyment’ would no longer be operative - instead, the starting point 
would be the rebuttable presumption of chattel. The uncertainty of the swathe of 
unpredictable and inconsistently-applied factors would give way to the clarity and simplicity 
of a presumed departure point of chattel status. In many instances, disputes could begin and 
end at this stage bringing much needed clarity and coherence to the law. If cases did proceed 
to the rebuttal stage, one or both grounds of rebuttal could be explored.  
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Rebuttal on the first ground by reference to an agreement would involve adopting the 
approach of Peter Butt and suggestions in the jurisprudence of New Zealand and Australia. 
The result would be to reverse the authority of the English & Welsh court in Melluish and 
Elitestone and the apparent prohibition on adducing subjective intentions. Instead, 
examination of the parties’ subjective intentions would be permissible in order to inform the 
court’s determination of the status of an item. As a consequence, the ongoing contestation 
seen the case law as to whether or not subjective intentions are pertinent would be resolved 
in the affirmative. Under the new framework, the subjective intentions of the parties would 
be relevant and could be adduced as evidence of the status of an item on land. If, for example, 
there was evidence of an agreement between the parties that an item was a fixture, and if 
this evidence was deemed credible by the court, the presumption of chattel would be 
rebutted and result in a finding that the item was a fixture. Provided the court is satisfied that 
the agreement between the parties was entered into freely without coercion or other 
vitiating factors, as Peter Butt has argued in Australia, adducing subjective intentions does 
not prejudice the parties but, rather, can strengthen and inform the court’s decision. If the 
court was not satisfied that any agreement between the parties existed or could be inferred 
from conduct, the presumption would remain in place and the item would be deemed to be 
a chattel unless rebutted under the second ground. 
Under the second ground for rebuttal, the presumption of chattel would be displaced if 
the court, having considered the circumstances of the case including the nature of the item, 
the intentions of the party who brought the item onto the land and the impact of removal of 
the item on the object itself and on the land, is satisfied that it would be unreasonable or 
inequitable to allow the item to be removed. The court’s determination would be highly fact-
sensitive but focused on one central issue, namely, the unreasonableness or inequity of 
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removal of the item. In so far as this central issue is defined and delimited, it is submitted, 
this enquiry obviates much of the obscurity and analytical messiness of the current law. By 
way of illustration, it might be unreasonable to remove an item that has been so fixed to the 
land as to become, in essence, part of the fabric or structure of the realty. It might be 
inequitable to remove an item on land on the basis of estoppel where assurances were made 
as to the nature or status of the item and those assurances were reasonably relied upon by 
another party to their detriment. 
The proposed framework has the advantage of offering clarity yet flexibility. In contrast, 
a hard, irrebuttable presumption would be entirely unresponsive to the particular facts of 
each case and would cause injustice; so too would a starting presumption that items brought 
onto land were fixtures. A presumption of fixture would operate unfairly and 
disproportionately benefit landowners who, historically the wealthier and more powerful 
party (as opposed to, say, tenants), would be unjustly enriched through operation of a 
presumption of fixture which would means items on land were de facto in their ownership. 
Thus, it is contended that the proposed heavy but rebuttable presumption of chattel strikes 
the appropriate balance between rationalising and streamlining the law yet without 
imposition of a rigid and unjust rule. Endowing the court with the ability to admit evidence of 
subjective intentions plus the safety-net provided by the potential for rebuttal of the 
presumption where its application would be unreasonable or inequitable ensures the law of 
fixtures is rationalised and simplified yet maintains the scope for examination of the 
particularities of each, individual case. It has the added benefit of avoiding that jumble of 
conflicting tests and analytical factors of the current law whilst still permitting the court to 
engage in a broad and case-sensitive examination of the factual matrix before it. Of course, 
one concern may be that the new framework would, in practice, involve slipping back into a 
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consideration of the same factors and indicators so problematic in the current approach. 
However, respectfully, this view should be rejected. It is argued that, by starting from a 
position of a rebuttable presumption of chattel, the result is that many disputes would be 
disposed of more speedily at this presumption stage without the need for further enquiry – 
and without recourse to the deficiencies of the current regime. This would be the case, for 
example, where disputes arise as to the status of items on land yet there is no meaningful 
evidence available to the court going to the issue of whether the items are chattels or fixtures 
as occurred in the case of Botham. Of course, there will always be difficult cases and one can 
conjure more vexed scenarios such as items retro-fitted into existing buildings, for example, 
light fittings, air conditioning units and smart or green energy improvements. Here, applying 
the proposed framework, the retro-fitted items would be presumed to be chattels. However, 
it is anticipated that the presumption would be rebutted either by evidence of an express, 
implied or inferred agreement between the parties (that the retro-fitting was intended to be 
a permanent part of the fabric of the building) or, alternatively, rebutted on the second 
ground: that given the permanent nature of the retro-fitted items, it would be unreasonable 
to remove them. The point is a simple one: even when one conceives of more complex or 
thornier scenarios, they can still be analysed with precision and rigour through the proposed 
new regime. 
 In addition to the potential to significantly facilitate and expedite speedy resolution of 
disputes, a clear, starting presumption of chattel would furthermore serve as a powerful 
incentive to parties to record in writing the precise status of items brought onto the land and 
would provide a further motivation to be explicit as to which items are and are not included, 
for example, in any sale of land, when a tenancy agreement is reached or when buildings are 
retro-fitted. In short, the proposed framework will galvanise parties to better reflect on and 
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record the status of items they bring onto land; stimulating an increase in and greater 
robustness of written agreements in relation to items on land. The effect will be to reduce 
the incidence of disputes over items on land and remove much of the inconsistency and 
complexity in the law. Finally, this would also allow practitioners the ability to advise their 
clients with greater confidence of the likely outcome if disputes were litigated.  
 
How, then, would this new framework function, in practice? It is instructive to explore how 
the framework might be operationalised by considering the facts of Botham; a case this article 
has argued represents the highwater mark of artificiality and absurdity in the law. Rather than 
fixating on unreasoned and unprincipled distinctions such as the objects’ ‘lifespan’ or whether 
the items were installed by a builder or a contractor, all objects in Botham would, at the 
outset, be presumed to be chattels subject to evidence of contrary intention or if, in the 
court’s assessment, it would be unreasonable or inequitable to remove them. On this 
assessment, toilet roll holders, towel rails and soap dishes would remain chattels (rather than 
the absurd finding of fixture status as seen in Botham). The presumption of chattel would not 
be rebutted in relation to these items as, first, there was no agreement between the parties 
or basis for inferring one on the facts of Botham and, secondly, it would clearly not be 
‘unreasonable’ to remove these items from the land. However, fitted kitchen units and built-
in sinks would be regarded as fixtures as the court would likely regard removal as 
unreasonable. The abandonment of the existing antiquated, anachronistic and arbitrary rules 
in favour of this new approach would have simplified the court’s determination of the 
fixture/chattel issue in Botham, avoided irrational determinations (e.g. that a showerhead is 
a fixture) and injected much needed common sense and predictability into the law. The same 
would be true for the so-called ‘architectural design’ cases which, as this article has exposed, 
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lack coherence and logic. The proposed framework would replace the problematic principle 
of ‘aesthetic scheme’ altogether. Were this framework to have been applied in, for example, 
the Tower Hamlets case, it would have sanctioned and opened up a fruitful examination of 
the subjective intentions of those who initiated the erection of the public art. This, in turn, 
would have allowed for a discussion as to why the object was erected, its public function and 
its intended community engagement. This evidence could have been the basis for rebuttal of 
the presumption of chattel and consequently have led to a finding that the sculpture was not 
a chattel as the court held in Tower Hamlets but was, in fact, a fixture –  a far more defensible 
and common sensical result, it is submitted. Equally, the new framework would have the 
effect of reversing the decisions of In Re Whaley and D’Eyncourt – two of the most contested 
and maligned ‘architectural design’ cases – on the basis that the presumption of chattel would 
be engaged but not be rebutted on the case facts meaning the items would have remained 
chattels. Many would accept this to be a more vindicable and rational outcome and would 
welcome the abandonment of the ‘architectural design’ concept that adoption of the new 
framework would messenger. 
 
This article has offered an analysis of the defects and failings of the current law of fixtures 
and chattels. In so doing, it has revealed the inconsistency and arbitrariness at the heart of 
decided cases applying the existing principles. Building on the problematic nature of the law, 
this article has made the case that new thinking is required in order to simplify, clarify and 
rationalise the court’s approach to fixtures and chattels. A new framework for governing the 
court’s determinations of the fixture/chattel divide has been offered which, it is contended, 
responds to the existing problems in the law and provides a significant contribution to the 
reform that is sore needed in this area. 
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